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§41-6a-304 UCA. Obeying devices - Effect of 
improper position, illegibility, or absence -
Presumption of lawful placement and 
compliance with chapter. 
(1) Except as otherwise directed by a peace 
officer or other authorized personnel under 
Section 41-6a-209 and except as provided under 
Section 41-6a-212 for authorized emergency 
vehicles, the operator of a vehicle shall obey the 
instructions of any traffic-control device placed or 
held in accordance with this chapter. 
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(2) (a) Any provision of this chapter, for which a 
traffic-control device is required, may not be 
enforced if at the time and place of the alleged 
violation the traffic-control device is not in proper 
position and sufficiently legible to be seen by an 
ordinarily observant person. 
(b) The provisions of this chapter are effective 
independently of the placement of a traffic-control 
device unless the provision requires the 
placement of a traffic-control device prior to its 
enforcement. 
(3) A traffic-control device placed or held in a 
position approximately conforming to the 
requirements of this chapter is presumed to have 
been placed or held by the official act or direction 
of a highway authority or other lawful authority, 
unless the contrary is established by competent 
evidence. 
(4) A traffic-control device placed or held under 
this chapter and purporting to conform to the 
lawful requirements of the device is presumed to 
comply with the requirements of this chapter, 
unless the contrary is established by competent 
evidence. 
1. Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 2, 2005 
General Session 
§ 72-6-114 UCA. Restricting use of or closing 
highway - Penalty for failure to observe 
barricade, warning light, etc. 
(1) A highway authority may close or restrict travel 
on a highway under their jurisdiction due to 
construction, maintenance work, or emergency. 
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(2) If a highway or portion of a highway is closed 
or restricted to travel, a highway authority shall 
cause suitable barriers and notices to be posted 
and maintained in accordance with Section 41-6a-
301. 
(3) A person who willfully fails to observe any 
barricade, warning light, sign, or flagman, used in 
accordance with this section, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
1. Amended by Chapter 2, 2005 General Session 
77-23-102. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Administrative traffic checkpoint" means a 
roadblock procedure where enforcement officers 
stop all, or a designated sequence of, motor 
vehicles traveling on highways and roads and 
subject those vehicles to inspection or testing and 
the drivers or occupants to questioning or the 
production of documents. 
(2) "Command level officer" includes all sheriffs, 
heads of law enforcement agencies, and all 
supervisory enforcement officers of sergeant rank 
or higher. 
(3) "Emergency circumstances" means 
circumstances where enforcement officers 
reasonably believe road conditions, weather 
conditions, or persons present a significant 
hazard to persons or the property of other persons. 
(4) "Enforcement officer" includes: 
(a) peace officers as defined in Title 53, Chapter 
13, Peace Officer Classifications; 
(b) correctional officers as defined in Title 53, 
Chapter 13; 
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(c) special function officers as defined and under 
the restrictions of Title 53, Chapter 13; and 
(d) federal officers as defined in Title 53, Chapter 
13. 
(5) "Magistrate" includes all judicial officers 
enumerated in Subsection 77-1-3(4). 
(6) "Motor vehicle" includes all vehicles as defined 
in Title 41, Chapter 1a. 
1. Amended by Chapter 282, 1998 General 
Session 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
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Article /, Section 2. [All political power 
inherent in the people.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all 
free governments are founded on their authority 
for their equal protection and benefit, and they 
have the right to alter or reform their government 
as the public welfare may require. 
Article I, Section 14. [Unreasonable searches 
forbidden ~ Issuance of warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. SHOULD THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR RESTRICTED USE OF A 
CLOSED HIGHWAY IN VIOLATION OF §72-6-114 UCA; BE REVERSED 
BECAUSE THE PHRASE "LOCAL TRAFFIC ONLY", WHEN USED IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH A ROAD CLOSED SIGN, IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
VAGUE? 
2. SHOULD THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR RESTRICTED USE OF A 
CLOSED HIGHWAY IN VIOLATION OF §72-6-114 UCA; BE REVERSED AND 
THE EVIDENCE BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE OFFICER JEPPSEN LACKED 
REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR EFFECTING A TRAFFIC STOP AND THE 
SUBSEQUENT SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT AND HIS VEHICLE IN 
VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH STATE 
CONSTITUTION? 
3. SHOULD THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR RESTRICTED USE OF A 
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CLOSED HIGHWAY IN VIOLATION OF §72-6-114 UCA; BE REVERSED AND 
THE EVIDENCE BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS A 
RESULT OF A "DE FACTO" UNAUTHORIZED ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC 
CHECKPOINT (ROADBLOCK ) THAT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE 
PROVISIONS OF § 77-23-102 UCA thru § 77-23-104 UCA AND WAS 
THEREFORE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 14 OF THE 
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION? 
4. SHOULD THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR RESTRICTED USE OF A 
CLOSED HIGHWAY IN VIOLATION OF §72-6-114 UCA; BE REVERSED 
BECAUSE THE PROSECUTOR VIOLATED THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
DOCTRINE AND THE UNIFORM APPLICATION OF LAWS DOCTRINE OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 2 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION? 
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POSITION ON ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellant anticipates the issue presented in this appeal will be adequately 
addressed by the parties' brief but appellant gladly welcomes the opportunity for 
oral argument. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 25, 2008 a criminal information (4:25 & 5:1-10) was filed in 
Layton City Court charging Appellant-Defendant with the Restricted Use of a 
Closed Highway in Violation of §72-6-114 UCA. On August 25, 2008 Appellant-
Defendant, following a bench trial, was convicted of violating §72-6-114 UCA 
(67:20 - 25 & 68:1-13) and was ordered to pay a fine of $120.00 (69:8-12). 
This case is before the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to a Notice of 
Appeal from the Judgement of Conviction and sentence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 18, 2008, at approximately 5:30 PM appellant was driving 
eastbound on Gentile Street in Layton, Utah. Portions of Gentile Street were 
under construction and barricades had been placed on Gentile Street at 3200 
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se 
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West and at 2200 West. The barricades were posted with signs "Road Closed -
Local Traffic Only". The barricades effectively restricted travel on the portion of 
Gentile Street between 3200 West and 2200 West to "Local Traffic Only". The 
barricades were placed in such a manner that traffic could still enter into and 
travel on Gentile Street in the area between 3200 West and 2200 West. There 
were various signs, including detour signs, that had been placed on Gentile 
Street to provide warning to vehicles approaching the barricades. None of the 
signs provided information to motorists informing them of the extent of the 
closure. Motorists approaching the "Road Closed - Local Traffic Only" signs were 
left to guess the extent of the closure on Gentile Street and therefore were left to 
guess whether or not their destination was within the "Local Traffic Only" area. 
Your appellant admits that he drove through the opening in the barricades at 
3200 West Gentile and continued traveling eastbound on Gentile Street. Your 
appellant was stopped by Layton Police Officers at approximately 2500 West 
Gentile. Your appellant observed that there were three marked Layton Police 
Vehicles, on the north side of Gentile Street, parked perpendicular to Gentile 
Street, with the vehicles facing Gentile Street. Your appellant also observed 
three Layton Police Officers, on foot, in the center of the road stopping vehicles 
and talking to the drivers. As your appellant approached the officers your 
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se 
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appellant observed two eastbound vehicles that had been stopped and also 
observed several westbound vehicles that had been stopped. Your appellant 
waited for several minutes while one of the eastbound vehicles received what 
appeared to be a citation. After waiting several minutes, and without having been 
contacted by an officer, your appellant began to make a U-turn. Your appellant 
then received a hand signal from one of the officers in the road, Officer Applonie, 
indicating that your appellant was not free to leave the area. Your appellant was 
contacted several minutes later by Officer Applonie who asked for appellants 
drivers license, registration, and asked appellant questions regarding the 
appellant's destination. Your appellant waited several minutes longer and was 
then contacted by a second Layton City Police Officer, Officer Jeppsen, who 
issued your appellant a citation for Restricted Use of a Closed Highway in 
Violation of §72-6-114 UCA. 
During direct examination Officer Jeppsen testified "The construction 
company that was in charge of the project had issued tags that would hang on 
your rearview mirror, and they had issued those to the residents of the area so 
that they could be more easily identified as being local traffic" (9:13-17). Officer 
Jeppsen also stated that "he (the appellant/defendant) did not have a decal in the 
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se 




During cross examination officer Jeppsen testified that Gentile Street, 
between 2200 West and 3200 West is a public Street (17:17-19). 
During cross examination by the appellant Officer Jeppsen was questioned 
regarding the methodology and the mechanics of the Layton Police Officers that 
were involved in enforcing the closure of Gentile Street on the afternoon of April 
18, 2008. Officer Jeppsen testified that there were three officers involved in 
enforcement activities on Gentile Street (16:22, 22). Officer Jeppsen further 
stated that the other officers involved were Sergeant Andrew Joseph and Officer 
Applonie (19:14). Officer Jeppsen testified that he and Sergeant Joseph and 
Officer Applonie had parked their patrol cars on the north side of Gentile Street 
(16:20-24) and the officers were on foot (17:1). Officer Jeppsen testified that "we 
were just watching cars go by, and if they didn't have a decal in the window, we 
would just approach on foot at the window and make the traffic stop that way" 
(17:2-5). 
During cross examination Officer Jeppsen was asked if the officers stopped 
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every vehicle that was traveling on Gentile Street that did not have a decal. 
Officer Jeppsen testified that they stopped "As many - - as many vehicles as we 
could handle" (17:8). Officer Jeppsen also testified that on occasions there were 
vehicles that had been stopped that were backed up behind one another (17:12-
16). 
During cross examination Officer Jeppsen testified that there were 
numerous reasons a vehicle without a "decal in the window" would be allowed to 
travel within the closed portion of Gentile Street. Appellant argues that if Layton 
Police were allowing some vehicles that were not displaying the tag/decal in their 
window to travel on the closed portion of Gentile Street it can be presumed that 
those vehicles were allowed to travel the road because they were not violating the 
road closure. Appellant also argues that if non-residents of the area were 
allowed to travel on the closed portion of Gentile Street it can be presumed that 
those vehicles were allowed to travel the road because they were not violating the 
road closure. Officer Jeppsen testified that if a motorist was going to one of the 
businesses in the area (20:24, 25 & 21:1-11) the motorist would not receive a 
citation. Officer Jeppsen further testified that a mail carrier (22:11, 12), an LDS 
home teacher (22:24, 25 & 23:1), or a teenager going into the area to visit a 
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friend (23:8-10) would not have received a citation. Officer Jeppsen also testified 
that if any person were traveling to a residence located within the closed portion 
of Gentile Street they would not have received a citation (23:4-7). 
Officer Jeppsen's response seems to indicate that if a motorist, traveling 
within the closed portion of Gentile Street, could articulate a destination within the 
road closure area, regardless of the motorists purpose of traveling to that 
destination, then the motorist would not receive a citation. It can be presumed 
that they would not have received a citation because they were not violating the 
road closure. 
During cross examination Officer Jeppsen was asked by appellant "Is there 
any way - - was there any way by looking at my vehicle prior to making the traffic 
stop that you had reasonable suspicion that I was not local traffic?" (23:15 -17). 
Officer Jeppsen's response was in part "Just that you didn't have a decal as a 
resident" (23:18). Appellant contends that driving a vehicle through a 
construction zone without displaying a placard or decal issued by the construction 
contractor - is not a crime or a traffic offense - and does not constitute reasonable 
suspicion for the purpose of making a traffic stop. 
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Officer Jeppsen testified during cross examination that the stop of 
appellant's car was "based on probable cause that - - that you were not a local 
resident" (24:12, 13). When asked to articulate that probable cause Officer 
Jeppsen testified "We made the stops because you - - the vehicles that didn't 
have the resident decals are the vehicles we stopped that day" (24:15-7). Officer 
Jeppsen then acknowledged that there were many exceptions that would allow a 
person without a "sticker" to drive in the closed area (24:18-21). 
Officer Jeppsen also stated during cross examination that they did not have 
a court order authorizing an administrative traffic check point (30:6-8). 
ARGUMENT 1 
1. SHOULD THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR RESTRICTED USE 
OF A CLOSED HIGHWAY IN VIOLATION OF §72-6-114 UCA; BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE THE PHRASE "LOCAL TRAFFIC ONLY", WHEN 
USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A ROAD CLOSED SIGN, IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE? 
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Appellant drove on a portion of Gentile Street in Layton that was posted 
with a sign "Road Closed - Local Traffic Only". Appellant contends that had the 
road been posted with only a "Road Closed" sign that the appellant, or any other 
motorist, would have committed a perse violation by driving on the road. 
Appellant contends that the additional language on the signage of "Local Traffic 
Only" changed the road closure so that it was no longer a perse violation. 
Appellant contends that because the language "Local Traffic Only" is not defined 
by State statute nor is it defined by the Federal Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices the term "Local Traffic Only" is unconstitutionally vague and is subject to 
multiple interpretations by a reasonable person. The failure to identify the 
boundaries and extent of the closure contributed to vagueness and the inability of 
a reasonable person to determine the definition of "Local Traffic Only". The 
United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have ruled that a 
statute must be sufficiently definite so as to discourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. Kolenderv. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 357; State v. 
Honie, 2002 UT 4 at 1[31. The United States Supreme Court has stated that to 
avoid unconstitutional vagueness, a statute must "establish minimal guidelines to 
govern law enforcement" such that it avoids entrusting "lawmaking to the 
moment-to-moment judgement of the policeman on his beat." Kolenderv. 
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Lawson, 461 U.S. at 358, 360. The testimony of Officer Jeppsen during trial 
makes it clear that his interpretation of the term "Local Traffic Only" was a 
"moment-to-moment judgement" by Officer Jeppsen and the Layton City Police 
officers operating the roadblock. Layton City Police Department's interpretation 
of the term "Local Traffic Only" has led to arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement by Layton police officers. 
The United States Supreme Court has stated "a statute which either forbids 
or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the 
first essential of due process of law." International Harvester Co. v. Kentucy, 
234 U.S. 216, 234 U.S. 221. 
The United States Supreme Court in Conally v. General Construction 
Co. 269 U. S. 385 has said: 
"The dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful 
cannot be left to conjecture. The citizen cannot be held to 
answer charges based upon penal statutes whose mandates 
are so uncertain that they will reasonably admit of different 
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constructions. A criminal statute cannot rest upon an 
uncertain foundation. The crime, and the elements 
constituting it, must be so clearly expressed that the ordinary 
person can intelligently choose, in advance, what course it is 
lawful for him to pursue. Penal statutes prohibiting the doing 
of certain things, and providing a punishment for their violation, 
should not admit of such a double meaning that the citizen 
may act upon the one conception of its requirements and the 
courts upon another." 
Appellant does not contend that §72-6-114 UCA is unconstitutionally vague 
but does contend that the phrase "Local Traffic Only" when used in conjunction 
with a road closed sign is unconstitutionally vague and allows for the unlawful 
discretionary, moment-to-moment interpretation and enforcement of the law by 
law enforcement officers. 
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se 




2. SHOULD THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR RESTRICTED USE OF A 
CLOSED HIGHWAY IN VIOLATION OF §72-6-114 UCA; BE REVERSED AND 
THE EVIDENCE BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE OFFICER JEPPSEN LACKED 
REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR EFFECTING A TRAFFIC STOP AND FOR 
THE SUBSEQUENT SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT AND HIS VEHICLE IN 
VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH STATE 
CONSTITUTION? 
A traffic stop is a "seizure" and appellant was subject to the protection of the 
Fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of 
the Utah State Constitution. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 
1769,1772 (1996); Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55. In order for law 
enforcement officers to stop a vehicle for a limited investigatory purpose an 
officer must have an individualized, reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity. The validity of an investigative stop is governed by the objective 
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se 
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standard of reasonableness set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1 (1968). 
Pursuant to this objective standard, an officer may not effectuate a stop based 
on an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,'" but may only act on 
"specific and articulable facts" which give rise to reasonable suspicion that the 
person committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Terry v. 
Ohio, at 22. Trial court testimony revealed that law enforcement officers were 
stopping every vehicle that was being operated in the closure area that was not 
displaying a placard. Appellant contends that law enforcement officers lacked 
articulable, individualized, reasonable suspicion for making the traffic stops. The 
posting of the sign "Road Closed - Local Traffic Only" removed the offense from 
being a perse violation. Local residents had been given a placard to display in 
their vehicle to identify their vehicle as "local traffic". However, many other 
drivers not displaying placards could legally and lawfully drive in and through the 
area of the closure. Testimony elicited during the trial identified many instances 
where a person without a placard could lawfully drive into the area of the "Local 
Traffic Only" closure. Officers who were stopping vehicles not displaying 
placards had no way of knowing whether the vehicle being stopped was actually 
"local traffic" or something other than "local traffic". Officers were only able to 
develop their reasonable suspicion for the stop after the stop had been made 
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and the driver had been questioned about his intended destination and the 
purpose of his travel into the area of the "Local Traffic Only" closure. The Utah 
Court of Appeals, in State v. Galvan, 2001 UT App 329, is quoted: 
1111 The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S Const. Amend. IV. 
"The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
extends to a person's automobile." State v. Friesen, 1999 UT 
App 262, m 12, 988P.2d 7 (citing State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 
1127, 1131 (Utah 1994). A law enforcement officer may stop 
a vehicle if the officer has a reasonable suspicion the vehicle 
is being operated in violation of the law. See id. 
The reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigative stop 
of an automobile must be judged against an objective standard 
- that is, whether there were specific and articulable facts 
known to the officer, which taken together with rational 
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inferences from these facts, created a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity to justify intrusion into the defendant's 
personal security. 
i d "In determining whether this objective standard has been 
met, the focus necessarily centers upon the facts known to the 
officer immediately before the stop." Jd "The burden of 
establishing those articulable facts falls on the State." State v. 
Kohl, 2000 UT 3 5 , V 1 , 999 P.2d 7. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, quoting State v. Bean, 869 P. 2d at 988, in 
Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, said: 
1J18. "[A] level two stop . . . must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion [or it] violates the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution." State v. Bean, 869 P. 2d at 988; see 
also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15(1999) ("A peace officer may 
stop any person in a public place when he has reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of 
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committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and 
may demand his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions.") "While the required level of suspicion is lower than 
the standard for probable cause to arrest, the same totality of 
facts and circumstances approach is used to determine if there 
are sufficient "specific and articulable facts" to support 
reasonable suspicion." City of St. George v. Carter, 945 
P.2d 165, 168 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Case. 
884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968))), cert-
denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). In determining whether 
this objective standard has been met, the focus necessarily 
centers upon the facts known to the officer immediately before 
the stop." State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262,1J12, 988 P.2d 
7. 
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 
418 (1981) has said: 
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The second element contained in the idea that an assessment 
of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion is the 
concept that the process just described must raise a suspicion 
that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in 
wrongdoing . . . . 
The information that was available to an officer observing traffic driving 
through the closed portion of Gentile Street would be equally consistent with a 
conclusion that the driver of the vehicle was acting lawfully as it would be with the 
conclusion that the driver of the vehicle was not acting lawfully. 
Appellant further cites two cases that, while not precedent setting in Utah, 
directly correlate to the fact circumstances of Appellant's case. The cases are 
State of Wisconsin v. Shawn A. Timm, Appeal No. 02-0162-CR (Not 
Published) and State v. Anderson, 620 N. W. 2d 56. These cases involve 
traffic stops of motorists traveling on roads marked "Road Closed - Local Traffic 
Only". Both courts made the determination that officers lacked reasonable 
suspicion for stopping motorists for simply traveling on a road marked "Road 
Closed - Local Traffic Only". 
In State of Utah v. Henry Thomas DeBooy, the Utah Supreme Court is 
quoted: 
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"Broad-based, suspicionless inquiries are reminiscent of the 
much hated and feared general warrants issued by the British 
Crown in colonial days, where British officers were given 
blanket authority to search wherever they pleased and for 
whatever might pique their interest. It was precisely this type 
of activity that the Fourth Amendment was designed to 
prohibit. Indeed, the use of general warrants was an important 
factor giving rise to the American Revolution. See_Stanford v. 
State, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965). This state's early settlers 
were themselves no strangers to the abuses of general 
warrants. Underlying the abuse of the general warrant was 
the perversion of the prosecutorial function from investigating 
known crimes to investigating individuals for the purpose of 
finding criminal behavior. A free society cannot tolerate such a 
practice". 
In State of Wisconsin V. Shawn A. Timm (Un-published Opinion of the 
Court of Appeals, see id.) Timm drove through a construction area that was 
controlled by barricades indicating "Road Closed" and "Local Traffic Only". The 
court of appeals ruled: 
fl 11. "It is undisputed that the roadway was not closed to 
traffic. Rather, it was open, but only to local traffic." 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals went on to say 
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fl 12. "We do not doubt that drivers sometimes violate "local 
traffic only" regulations in construction zones at all times of the 
day or night. But such generalized suspicion does not 
translate into unbridled police authority to stop and detain all 
vehicles entering into such areas. In such a situation, the 
police must accumulate additional information which 
transforms the initial "hunch" into a "reasonable suspicion" 
before a Terry stop is permitted." 
Appellant cites another similar ruling from the Minnesota Court of Appeals. 
In State of Minnesota v. David Shafer Anderson, 620 N. W. 2d 56; a Wright 
County officer stopped Anderson for driving around a barricade marked "road 
closed local traffic only." The record reflects that although the road was under 
construction, it was passable. In this case the Court of appeals is quoted in their 
ruling as saying: 
"the records contains no evidence of circumstances sufficient 
to warrant the investigative stop of appellant. Because the 
stop was based on enforcing traffic movement restrictions in a 
specific geographic area , it was not wholly whimsical. But the 
officer stopped the appellant without any reason to believe that 
a violation of the law was occurring. The information available 
to the officer was consistent with a conclusion that appellant 
was acting lawfully." 
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Finally, "The right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and right 
i 
most valued by civilized men" Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 
(1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting), is a right that law enforcement officials and all 
citizens must respect and actively seek to protect. 
The stop of appellant's car was made without reasonable suspicion. The 
admission by appellant that the appellant was traveling through the closed portion 
of Gentile Street to reach a destination outside of the road closure area must be 
suppressed because Officer Jeppsen did not have reasonable suspicion to make 
the stop. An unlawful search and seizure cannot by justified by what it 
fortuitously manages to produce. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 
(1948) "[A] search is not made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad 
when it starts and does not change character from its success". Accordingly, the 
evidence obtained as the fruits of the unlawful stop of appellant's vehicle must be 
suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
ARGUMENT 3 
SHOULD THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR RESTRICTED USE OF A 
CLOSED HIGHWAY IN VIOLATION OF §72-6-114 UCA; BE REVERSED AND 
THE EVIDENCE BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS A 
RESULT OF A "DE FACTO" UNAUTHORIZED ADMINISTRATIVE TRAFFIC 
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se 
340 West 100 North, Kaysville, UT 84037 
Telephone 801-231-5745 
-22- Defendant/Appellant 
CHECKPOINT (ROADBLOCK ) THAT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE 
PROVISIONS OF § 77-23-102 UCA thru § 77-23-104 UCA AND WAS 
THEREFORE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 14 OF THE 
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION? 
§77-23-102 (1) UCA states: "Administrative traffic checkpoint" means a 
roadblock procedure where enforcement officers stop all, or a designated 
sequence of, motor vehicles traveling on highways and roads and subject those 
vehicles to inspection or testing and the drivers or occupants to questioning or 
the production of documents. 
Appellant contends that the actions and conduct of Sergeant Joseph, 
Officer Applonie and Officer Jeppsen were consistent with "a roadblock 
procedure where enforcement officers stop all, or a designated sequence of, 
motor vehicles traveling on highways and roads and subject those vehicles to 
inspection or testing and the drivers or occupants to questioning or the 
production of documents" §77-23-102 (1). The three officers were stopping all 
vehicles not displaying a placard or a decal (17:2-5). Their conduct was 
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tantamount to "stopping all, or a designated sequence of, motor vehicles and 
subject those vehicles to inspection or testing and the drivers or occupants to 
questioning or the production of documents". 
Trial court testimony revealed that at the time the appellant was issued a 
citation that there were three Layton City officers working within the closure area 
at approximately 2500 West Gentile. Court testimony indicated that the officers 
had their vehicles parked perpendicular to Gentile Street on the north side of the 
street. The three officers were on foot in the middle of the road stopping all 
vehicles not displaying an authorized placard. Officers who were stopping 
vehicles not displaying placards had no way of knowing whether the vehicle 
being stopped was actually a vehicle that constituted "local traffic" or something 
other than "local traffic". The information that was available to an officer 
observing traffic driving through the closed portion of Gentile Street would be 
"equally consistent with a conclusion that the driver of the vehicle was acting 
lawfully as it would be with the conclusion that the driver of the vehicle was not 
acting lawfully" State of Minnesota v. David Shafer Anderson, 620 N. W. 2d 
56. 
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In State of Minnesota v. David Shafer Anderson, 620 N. W. 2d 56, 
Anderson also argued that the officer's conduct along with his actions in 
stopping numerous cars entering into the "road closed local traffic only" area 
constituted an unlawful checkpoint. The Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed 
with Anderson's claim when it said: 
"Appellant contends that the stops, which involved numerous 
cars, constituted an unlawful checkpoint. The argument 
merely restates appellant's concerns about the stop; a series 
of stops not individually justified based on appellant's or 
anyone else's conduct could only be part of a checkpoint. The 
state concedes that a checkpoint would not be justified under 
these circumstances." 
The United States Supreme Court, because of valid Fourth Amendment 
concerns, has placed very restrictive guidelines for law enforcement use of 
roadblocks or administrative traffic checkpoints. § 77-23-102 UCA thru § 77-23-
104 UCA was created to provide clear constitutional guidelines for Utah law 
enforcement officers wishing to conduct Administrative Traffic Checkpoints. The 
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conduct and actions of Layton Police officers showed clear disregard for Utah 
Law, the Utah Constitution, and the United States Constitution. The traffic 
checkpoint being operated by the Layton Police Department on April 18, 2008 
was conducted without the approval of a magistrate. At the time the traffic 
checkpoint was being operated law enforcement officers were not "acting 
pursuant to a duly authorized search warrant or arrest warrant". (§77-23-103 (1)); 
they did not have "probable cause to arrest or search". (§77-23-103 (2)); they 
did not have "reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is 
occurring". (§77-23-103 (3)); and they were not "acting under emergency 
circumstances". (§77-23-103 (4)). 
ARGUMENT 4 
SHOULD THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR RESTRICTED USE OF 
A CLOSED HIGHWAY IN VIOLATION OF §72-6-114 UCA; BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE THE PROSECUTOR VIOLATED THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION DOCTRINE AND THE UNIFORM APPLICATION OF 
LAWS DOCTRINE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 2 OF THE 
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UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION? 
The prosecutor violated the Shondel Doctrine, as clarified by State V. 
Williams, Utah App 244 (2008), in discriminating against the appellant by 
charging appellant with Restricted Use of Closed Highway in Violation of §72-6-
114 UCA (A Class B Misdemeanor) rather than the lesser included offense of 
Failure to Obey a Traffic Control Device in violation of § 41-6a-304 UCA (A Class 
C Misdemeanor). The prosecutor made several offers to the appellant to reduce 
the charge from the Restricted Use of Closed Highway in Violation of §72-6-114 
UCA (A Class B Misdemeanor) to the lesser included offense of Failure to Obey a 
Traffic Control Device in violation of § 41-6a-304 USA (A Class C Misdemeanor) 
if the appellant would enter a guilty plea to the lesser charge. During pre-trial 
conferences the prosecutor indicated that he had made the same offer to other 
defendants charged with the same violation. The appellant contends that the 
prosecutor abused his prosecutorial discretion in a discriminatory manner by filing 
a criminal information for the more serious charge of the Restricted Use of Closed 
Highway in Violation of §72-6-114 UCA (A Class B Misdemeanor) against only 
those defendants who refused to enter a guilty plea to the reduced charge Failure 
to Obey a Traffic Control Device in violation of § 41-6a-304 USA (A Class C 
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Misdemeanor). The Utah Uniform Bail Schedule lists the recommended bail for 
Failure to Obey a Traffic Control Device in violation of § 41-6a-304 UCA at 
$80.00. The Utah Uniform Bail Schedule lists the recommended bail for the 
Restricted Use of Closed Highway in Violation of §72-6-114 UCA at $580.00. 
Appellant contends that the prosecutor's abuse of his discretionary authority may 
have tended to persuade an innocent person to plead guilty to a lesser violation 
rather than face the uncertainty of a trial on a more serious charge. Further, 
appellant's conduct and the nature of appellant's violation was no different that 
the conduct and nature of the violation of those motorists that were ultimately 
charged with Failure to Obey a Traffic Control Device in violation of § 41-6a-304 
USA (A Class C Misdemeanor). 
The Shondel Doctrine, as clarified by Williams, allows a prosecutor 
discretion in deciding whether or not to prosecute a person for a more serious 
offense or a lesser included offense - but that discretion must be based upon the 
facts, evidence, and circumstances of the conduct - and not be based upon the 
willingness of a defendant to agree to plead guilty to a lesser included offense. In 
quoting State of Utah v. Williams, Utah App 244 (2008), the Utah Supreme 
Court said: 
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U 10. "The notion that a prosecutor may be empowered to 
charge two people who have engaged in the same conduct 
with different crimes carrying different penalties is one that 
offends our sense of fairness. We have also found it to violate 
the guarantees of equal protection of the law enshrined in the 
United States Constitution. E. q.. State v. Shondel. 453 P. 2d 
146,147 (Utah 1969). We have come to characterize what 
has come to be known as the Shondel doctrine this way: 
"Equal protection of the law guarantees like treatment of all 
those who are similarly situated. Accordingly, the criminal 
laws must be written so that.. . the exact same conduct is not 
subject to different penalties depending upon which of two 
statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to charge." 
Ronald Charles Barton, Pro Se 




For the reasons set forth above, appellant respectfully requests that the 
judgement of conviction and sentence be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD CHARLES BARTON, Pro Se 
Appellant 
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Instate v. Anderson 
Minn.App.,2000. 
Court of Appeals of Minnesota. 
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, 
v. 
David Shafer ANDERSON, Appellant. 
No. C5-00-855. 
Dec. 19,2000. 
Defendant moved to suppress evidence discovered 
during traffic stop. The District Court, Wright 
Page 1 
HOXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General 
110k! 134 Scope and Extent in General 
HOkl 134(3) k. Questions Considered 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
In reviewing pretrial suppression orders, appellate 
court independently reviews the facts and determines 
as a matter of law whether the trial court erred in its 
decision. 
£21 Arrest 35 €=^63.5(4) 
35 Arrest I 
3511 On Criminal Charges 
35k63.5 Investigatory Stop or Stop-And-Frisk 
County, Bruce R. Douglas, J., denied motion 
Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Crippen, 
J., held that officer had no basis to stop defendant for 




1U Criminal Law 110 €=>l 134(3) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
35k63.5(3) Grounds for Stop or 
Investigation 
35k63.5(4) k. Reasonableness; 
Reasonable or Founded Suspicion, Etc. Most Cited 
Cases 
In order to conduct a stop for limited investigatory 
purposes, an officer must have reasonable articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity; all that is required is 
that the stop be not the product of mere whim, 
caprice, or idle curiosity. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
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48Ak349(2) Grounds 
48Ak349(2.1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Ordinarily, an officer's observation of a traffic-
law violation will provide an objective basis to 
support a stop. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 




48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or 
Deposit 
48Ak349(2) Grounds 
48Ak349(2.1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Officer had no basis for stopping motorist for driving 
around barricade marked "road closed local traffic 
only"; officer had no reason to believe that a violation 
of law was occurring, and there was no evidence in 
record to indicate that any citizens had violated or 
were violating local-traffic-only restriction. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
*5 7 Syllabus by the Court 
To have an articulable basis for a stop, the officer 
must have some knowledge or suspicion that the 
conduct observed is not wholly lawful. 
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, and Thomas 
N. Kelly, Wright County Attorney, Anne L. Mohaupt, 




David G. Roston, Segal, Roston & Berris, P.L.L.P., 
Minneapolis, for appellant. 
Considered and decided by WILLIS, Presiding Judge, 
CRIPPEN. Judge, and PETERSON, Judge. 
OPINION 
CRIPPEN. Judge. 
Appellant disputes the trial court's refusal to suppress 
evidence obtained when an officer stopped appellant 
for passing by a barricade marked "road closed local 
traffic only." Because the evidence shows that the 
officer had no reason to suspect that appellant's 
conduct was not wholly lawful, we reverse. 
FACTS 
A Wright County officer stopped appellant Anderson 
for driving around a barricade marked "road closed 
local traffic only." Although the road was under 
construction, it was passable, and there were other 
roads that led into the area. The officer stationed at 
the barricade was engaged in stopping every car to 
verify whether the driver was an area resident. 
The record contains some evidence that the officer 
stopped numerous cars but is devoid of any evidence 
regarding the duration and frequency of the stops or 
any suggestion that the officer knew appellant or any 
other drivers were using the road for purposes other 
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than local-traffic use. 
ISSUE 
Did the trial court err in denying appellant's motion to 
suppress the evidence? 
ANALYSIS 
T11 In reviewing pretrial suppression orders, this court 
independently reviews the facts and determines as a 
matter of law whether the trial court erred in its 
decision. State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 
(Minn. 1999). 
121131 In order to conduct a stop for limited 
investigatory purposes, an officer "must have 
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity." State v. Munson. 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 
(Minn.1999) (citing Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,21-
22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). 
"All that is required is that the stop be not the 
product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity." 
Marben v. State. Dep't of Pub. Safety. 294 N.W.2d 
697, 699 (Minn.1980) (quotation omitted). 
Ordinarily, an officer's observation of a traffic-
law violation will provide an objective basis to 
support a stop. State v. George. 557 N.W.2d 575, 
578(Minn.l997). 
[41 The state insists that, under these circumstances, 
the officer had reason to believe that appellant might 
have been violating the law because Minn.Stat. $ 
160.27. subd. 5(14) (1998), provides that it is a 
misdemeanor to drive around a barricade erected to 
close a road to public traffic. But the state does not 
deny, based on the record here, that the officer had no 
Page 3 
reason to believe that appellant was acting 
unlawfully. 
Under these circumstances, the officer's belief that a 
traffic offense was occurring was not based on a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion. Cf. United States v. 
Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 9-10, 109 S.Ct. 1581. 1586-87. 
104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (finding that a series of wholly 
lawful acts, when taken together, can warrant further 
investigation). In *58Britton, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court evaluated the constitutionality of stopping 
someone solely for driving a car with a broken 
window. State v. Britton. 604 N.W.2d 84. 88-89 
(Minn.2000). The court found that the record 
contained no evidence of an assessment, based either 
on training or experience, that appellant's broken 
window indicated that the car was stolen; thus, the 
court concluded that evidence obtained as a result of 
the stop should have been excluded. Id. at 89. 
Here, the record contains no evidence of 
circumstances sufficient to warrant the investigative 
stop of appellant. Because the stop was based on 
enforcing traffic movement restrictions in a specific 
geographic area, it was not wholly whimsical. But the 
officer stopped appellant without any reason to 
believe that a violation of law was occurring. The 
information available to the officer was consistent 
with a conclusion that appellant was acting lawfully. 
In fact, there is no evidence in the record to indicate 
that any citizens had violated or were violating the 
local-traffic-only restriction. Appellant claims that he 
was within the broad parameters of the definition of 
local traffic and he was never charged with the 
misdemeanor offense. 
The United States Supreme Court noted the illegality 
of stops such as the one involved in this case when it 
evaluated warrantless stops to enforce the National 
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Prohibition Act: 
It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a 
prohibition agent were authorized to stop every 
automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and 
thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways 
to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 
S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). We conclude 
that the impact of this decision is not diminished 
by the fact that the stop of appellant, in a limited 
geographic area where violations might occur, was 
less than wholly whimsical. The officer could not 
reasonably state a basis to stop a driver without 
articulation of more specific cause to believe that 
the driver was not acting lawfully. 
Appellant contends that the stops, which involved 
numerous cars, constituted an unlawful checkpoint. 
This argument merely restates appellant's concerns 
about the stop; a series of stops not individually 
justified based on appellant's or anyone else's conduct 
could only be part of a checkpoint. The state 
concedes that a checkpoint would not be justified 
under these circumstances. See Ascher v. 
Commissioner of Pub. Safety. 519 N.W.2d 183, 186 
(Minn. 1994) (articulating the burden for departure 
Page 4 
from the general requirement of individualized 
suspicion). 
DECISION 
The record does not contain sufficient evidence to 
justify the stop of appellant. The motion to suppress 
the evidence should have been granted and the trial 
court erred in denying it. Because the state does not 
suggest that prosecution of the case is viable after this 
suppression, we reverse. 
Reversed. 
Minn.App.,2000. 
State v. Anderson 
620 N.W.2d 56 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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State of Wisconsin, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
Shawn A. Timm, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Winnebago County: BRUCE SCHMIDT, Judge. 
Reversed and cause remanded. 
f 1. NETTESHEIM, P. J.- Shawn A. Timm appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor 
vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), second offense, contrary to Wis. Stat. §346.63(1 )(a). Timm contends 
that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence because the arresting officer did 
No. 02-0162 Page 2 of4 
not have reasonable suspicion to detain him. We agree. We reverse the judgment and remand for further 
proceedings. 
FACTS 
f2. On August 19, 2001, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Officer Adam Streubel was driving down Main 
Street in the city of Neenah. Main Street was under construction from Green Bay Road through to a new 
overpass and was controlled by barricades on both sides of Lake Street, indicating "road closed" and 
"local traffic only." As Streubel approached Lake Street traveling west on Main Street, he observed a red 
truck traveling eastbound on Main Street cross Lake Street by maneuvering around the barricade and 
continuing down Main Street. Streubel turned around and followed the truck, intending to stop it for 
traveling through a construction area. Streubel observed the truck turn onto Harrison Street at the bottom 
of the overpass. Harrison Street had not yet been paved and the truck went down a six-inch drop to a 
gravel surface. Streubel followed the truck onto Harrison Street and activated his emergency lights. The 
truck pulled over and Streubel made contact with Timm. 
f 3. Streubel observed that Timmfs driver's license indicated a Menasha, Wisconsin address. When asked 
why he was in the construction area, Timm indicated that he was on his way to Gord's Bar and was 
unfamiliar with the area. Timm admitted having seen the barricades. During the course of his 
conversation with Timm, Streubel observed that Timm's "eyelids were heavy.... His eyes were very 
glassy and his speech was slow and deliberate." When asked whether he had had anything to drink, 
Timm replied that he had. Streubel administered field sobriety tests, determined that Timm was 
operating under the influence of intoxicants and arrested him. Timm was transported to the Neenah 
police department where he was administered a breath test resulting in a .16% blood alcohol 
concentration. 
f4. The State filed a criminal complaint against Timm on September 7,2001, charging him with OWI, 
second offense, and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration, second 
offense. Timm filed a number of pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress evidence alleging that 
Streubel lacked a reasonable suspicion to detain him. Following a motion hearing on October 24, 2001, 
the trial court denied Timiris motion to suppress. Timm subsequently pled guilty to the OWI offense. He 
now appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. 
DISCUSSION 
Tf5. In reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, we will uphold a circuit court's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous. State v. Eckart, 203 Wis. 2d 497, 518, 553 N.W.2d 539 (Ct. App. 1996). 
However, the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found is a question of law that we 
decide without deference to the circuit court. State v. Patricia A.P., 195 Wis. 2d 855, 862, 537 N.W.2d 
47 (Ct. App. 1995). 
[^6. The stop of a vehicle and the detention of its passengers constitute a seizure within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution; however, there are situations in which an 
investigative stop may be constitutionally permissible when prompted by an officer's suspicion that the 
occupants have committed a crime. State v. Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d 663, 675, 407 N.W.2d 548 (1987). For an 
investigatory stop to be valid, a law enforcement officer must reasonably suspect, in light of his or her 
experience, that some kind of criminal activity has taken or is taking place. State v. Richardson, 156 
Wis.2d 128, 139,456 N.W.2d 830 (1990). Whether an officer's suspicion justifies an investigative stop 
involves an objective test. Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d at 675. "Law enforcement officers may only infringe on 
the individual's interest to be free of a stop and detention if they have a suspicion grounded in specific, 
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articulable facts and reasonable inferences from those facts, that the individual has committed a crime." 
Id. An "inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'" will not suffice. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1,27(1968)). 
f7. Reasonableness is measured against an objective standard taking into consideration the totality of the 
circumstances. Richardson, 156 Wis.2d at 139. The question of what constitutes reasonable suspicion is 
a commonsense test: under all the facts and circumstances present, what would a reasonable police 
officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience. State v. Jackson, 147 Wis.2d 
824, 831,434 N.W.2d 386 (1989). 
[^8. Before turning to the merits of Timm's appeal, we turn first to his challenge to the State's 
characterization of the facts. In its appellate brief, the State contends that Streubel had a reasonable 
suspicion that Timm violated Wis. Stat. §346.04(2) by failing to obey the "road closed" and "local traffic 
only" signs. Section 346.04(2) requires motorists to obey posted traffic signs unless directed by an 
officer. In support of its argument, the State indicates that Streubel "observed Timm proceed enter [sic] 
a construction area, pass through that area, then exit the construction area." From this, the State argues 
that Timm used the construction area "as if it were a normal street open to regular public traffic." 
f 9. However, the State fails to provide any citation to the record to corroborate the fact that Timm exited 
the construction zone prior to being pulled over by Streubel. Such a failure is a violation of Wis. Stat. 
Rule 809.19(3), which requires a respondent's brief to comply with subsec. (1), which, in turn, requires 
"a statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for review, with appropriate references to the 
record." Rule809.19(l)(d). This failure is particularly offensive in this case because the State's 
representation, if true, would likely result in our affirming the trial court's ruling. However, based on our 
independent review of the record, we find no indication that Streubel observed Timm exit the 
construction zone. Moreover, the State did not argue this point before the trial court; nor did the trial 
court rely on it in arriving at its decision. We admonish the State to be more circumspect in the future. 
f^lO. Following the hearing, the trial court made the following findings: 
[T]his stop took place about one o'clock in the morning. Both sides are in 
agreement that there were signs posted in this construction site, that the signs 
said "road closed, local traffic only," that there were barricades up, and that the 
defendant in this case went around the barricades and proceeded down the road. 
Although I guess there was an opening that one could do that. 
[Timm] was ultimately cited for failing to obey a sign and going into a 
construction zone, but the fact that the defendant in this case was not speeding, 
was not swerving, had the appropriate equipment on his car is fine, but he did 
go into an area that was posted "road closed, open to local traffic only" or for 
local traffic only. I think the officer because of the time, because of the day of 
the week, certainly had the right to stop the vehicle to determine whether or not 
he did fit one of those exceptions to being on the road. 
As noted earlier, the trial court did not make a finding that Timm exited or "passed through" the 
construction zone. Rather, the court determined that Timm's entry into a construction zone open to 
"local traffic only," coupled with the time of day and the day of the week, was sufficient to provide a 
reasonable suspicion that he had committed a crime. 
f 11. It is undisputed that the roadway was not closed to traffic. Rather, it was open, but only to local 
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traffic. Other than entering the controlled area during the early morning hours of a weekend day, the 
State did not argue, and the trial court did not find, that any other evidence suggested possible 
wrongdoing by the operator of the vehicle. Under these facts, we disagree with the trial court's 
conclusion that Streubel had reasonable suspicion to believe that Timm had committed, was committing, 
or was about to commit a crime or forfeiture offense. 
1(12. This case presents a classic example of a stop based upon the "unparticularized suspicion or hunch" 
condemned by Terry and Guzy. We do not doubt that drivers sometimes violate "local traffic only" 
regulations in construction zones at all times of the day or night. But such generalized suspicion does 
not translate into unbridled police authority to stop and detain all vehicles entering into such areas. In 
such a situation, the police must accumulate additional information which transforms the initial "hunch" 
into "reasonable suspicion" before a Terry stop is permitted. Here, had Streubel waited and continued to 
observe Timm's vehicle, he may have acquired additional information warranting a Terry stop, i.e., 
Timm exiting the construction area. But he did not. 
CONCLUSION 
f 13. We conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop 
Timm's vehicle. We reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
By the Court, -Judgment reversed and cause remanded. 
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1 )(b)4. 
1 This opinion is decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. §752.3 l(2)(c) (1999-2000). All statutory 
references are to the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise noted. 
2 Streubel testified that Main Street was under construction from Green Bay Road to the new overpass, 
Streubel encountered Timm on Main Street as he crossed Lake Street. Streubel finally pulled Timm over 
on Harrison Street below the overpass. The record indicates that Harrison Street had a gravel surface, 
was not paved and was still in the process of being completed. 
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